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THE NATURAL-LAW CLAIM TO SANCTUARY FOR
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES
I. INTRODUCTION
In the pre-dawn hours of November 16, 1989 in El Salvador, gun-
men in military uniform murdered six Jesuit priests, the priests' cook and
the cook's daughter.1 An army colonel, three lieutenants and four
soldiers have been arrested in connection with the murders.2 This atroc-
ity and the resurgence of fighting in El Salvador have refocused attention
on the bloodshed in Central America. Specifically, attention has focused
on the tragic impact this bloodshed has on the people of those nations; an
impact that all too often amounts to persecution by both the rebels and
the government. This persecution has motivated thousands of Central
Americans to flee their homes and seek refuge in the United States.
Tragically, under current immigration laws,3 the United States de-
1. L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
2. L.A. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
3. In an effort to clarify the United States' refugee policy and to conform its refugee law
to the United Nations' 1967 Protocol, 19 U.S.T. 6224, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,
Congress passed sweeping immigration laws, including the 1980 Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) In fact, "the Refugee
Act of 1980... amended the Immigration and Nationality Act so as to bring United States
statutory provisions into conformity" with international law. Bolanos-Hernandez v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv., 767 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1984). Through this legislation,
an otherwise deportable alien who claims he or she will face persecution if deported has two
statutory methods on which to rely. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
First, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the "Attorney General shall not de-
port or return any alien.., to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's
life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
Alternatively, under the 1980 Refugee Act, the Attorney General has discretion to grant
asylum to an alien who "is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101 (a)(42)(A) of [title 8]."
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). Finally, the term refugee means a person who is "unable or unwill-
ing to return to that home country'because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
Therefore, in 1980, Congress created two forms of relief: (1) mandatory withholding of
deportation for those who can show they will be persecuted; and (2) a discretionary grant of
asylum for those with a well-founded fear of persecution. By creating a "broad class of refu-
gees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are
given a statutory right not to be deported to the country where they are in danger," Congress
clearly intended to conform to the 1967 Protocol, and incorporated the principle of non-refoul-
ment through the mandatory withholding of deportation provision. Immigration and Natural-
ization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987). The principle of non-refoulment
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nies most Central Americans asylum.4 Asylum is usually denied because
,of the substantial deference with which the appeals courts review the de-
cisions of immigration judges (an administrative law judge) and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and also because most refugees
lack the concrete, objective proof of persecution required by many
courts. 5
mandates that a person not be returned to any country where that person will suffer persecu-
tion. G. FOURLANOS, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INGRESS OF ALIENS 147 (1986). For a discus-
sion of the 1967 Protocol and non-refoulment, see infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, practical difficulties in interpreting and applying these provisions have resulted
in arbitrary denials of relief for refugees fleeing "friendly nations." See infra notes 156-60 and
accompanying text. These denials in turn prodded the sanctuary movement into action.
4. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
5. See Rebollo-Jovel v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 794 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.
1986); Diaz-Escobar v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).
The Ninth Circuit first enunciated the deferential substantial evidence standard for reviewing
asylum and withholding of deportation appeals in Diaz-Escobar. Id. at 1493. Under this stan-
dard, the burden of proof rests solely on the applicant; the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) is not required to produce any evidence to counter the applicant's claims. Id.
Further, the standard requires only that the BIA's conclusion be substantially reasonable
based on the evidence presented. Id. The court stated the BIA could not be reversed "simply
because [the court] disagree[d] with [the BIA's] evaluation of the facts, but only if [the court]
conclude[d] that the BIA's decision is not supported by substantial evidence." Id. While this
standard may not appear overly deferential on its face, in its application the standard effec-
tively acts as a rubber-stamp review of asylum and deportation hearing decisions.
For example, in Diaz-Escobar, the refugee feared persecution in Guatemala by the guerril-
las because he chose to remain neutral in the conflict between the government and the guerril-
las. Id. at 1490. Diaz-Escobar testified that a note left on his car (presumably by the
guerrillas) which warned him "to leave the country or 'be subject to the consequences,' " moti-
vated his flight from Guatemala. Id. The court affirmed the decision of the immigration judge
and the BIA denying both forms of relief since Diaz-Escobar could not produce the letter, and
therefore lacked any concrete proof of persecution. Id. However, it does not seem reasonable
to require a refugee who fled his country fearing for his life, to keep a letter which could
effectively be his death warrant if he were stopped on his journey. Further, it is highly unlikely
that a refugee would contemplate the need for concrete evidence to prove his persecution dur-
ing the trauma of flight.
The court also focused on the lack of concrete proof of persecution in Rebollo-Jovel.
There, the refugee testified that his uncle, a political official with the same surname as him had
been assassinated, that two cousins were also murdered, and that he himself had received three
threatening messages and been interrogated by individuals "posing as policemen who told him
'not to get involved' in matters that were none of his business." Rebollo-Jovel, 794 F.2d at 447.
The court stated that he had established neither a clear probability of persecution to qualify for
withholding of deportation, nor a well-founded fear of persecution to qualify for a discretion-
ary grant of asylum. Id. at 448. The court reasoned that his testimony merely reflected the
general unrest in El Salvador, and even though the threats were specifically directed at him, he
had not concretely proven any political motivation behind the threats. Id. at 447-48.
Finally, courts have upheld the BIA's denial of relief even when the refugee presented
concrete evidence. In Cruz-Lopez v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., the refugee had
saved a note during his traumatic flight from El Salvador. 802 F.2d 1518, 1519 (4th Cir.
1986). The note, from Salvadoran guerrillas, demanded that he "[j]oin the [guerrillas] or...
regret it." Id. The court stated that the note did not constitute concrete evidence since "such
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The "sanctuary movement" in the United States responds to this
tragic situation by helping Central Americans cross the United States'
border, and by sheltering them once they arrive. The roots of the con-
temporary sanctuary movement reach far back in history, based on
religious and philosophical grounds. Both the religious and the philo-
sophical sources nurture the natural-law claim to the right of sanctuary.6
In analyzing this claim, this Comment first presents the tradition of sanc-
tuary in its Greco-Roman and medieval forms, then introduces the mod-
em United States movement, and discusses the contemporary tragedy of
Central American refugees whom the sanctuary movement attempts to
shelter. After sketching this background picture, the Comment focuses
on the religious and philosophical arguments, as well as relevant human-
rights and international documents, which together form the basis of the
natural-law claim to the right of sanctuary.
A. Natural Law
A primary foundation to understanding the natural-law claim for
sanctuary is a general understanding of natural law. Natural law stems
back to "the earliest stages of Greek speculation about the human condi-
tion," and continued with Roman philosophers as well.7 In the thir-
teenth century, Saint Thomas Aquinas made "natural law a cornerstone
of his philosophy."' Thomas Hobbes and John Locke "each referred to
the premises of [their] systems as dictates of nature."9 The theory of
notes are distributed widely throughout El Salvador and they are frequently nothing more
than idle threats." Id. at 1522. Diaz-Escobar, Rebollo-Jovel and Cruz-Lopez are typical of
many decisions that employ a deferential standard of review and hold the refugee to a very
strict evidentiary burden, a burden that is almost impossible for many to meet.
6. The religious sources stem from the Bible. See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying
text. The philosophical sources stem from natural law. See infra notes 103-60 and accompa-
nying text. Ignatius Bau, an attorney working primarily in immigration law, described the
sanctuary movement as follows:
The sanctuary movement can never be divorced from its religious context. It is
not politics in the conventional sense.... It is a brand of political activity.., similar
to the civil rights movement because it is non-violent and church-based [and] ...
similar to the anti-war movement during the Vietnam War because it is fundamen-
tally a call for non-intervention and peace. However, it is perhaps closest to the
Underground Railroad for fugitive slaves during the United States Civil War because
it is a mass rejection of the presumptions and values of the status quo. The...
movement is like the Underground Railroad because while it is inevitably a political
act to break the law-an act of civil disobedience-law-breaking is not the primary
motivation for sanctuary.
I. BAU, TIs GROUND IS HOLY 20 (1985).
7. L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 1 (1987). Aristotle and Cicero were two
famous early natural law philosophers. Id.
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id.
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natural law appears through many different viewpoints. However, link-
ing all these varied voices is the underlying belief of all naturalists that
certain self-evident and fundamental truths about human nature exist
and are discoverable through reason.'° In turn these truths create rules
of behavior to which conduct ought to conform.II This naturalist model
gives structure to the arguments for the right to sanctuary.
B. Introductory History of Sanctuary
The tradition of granting sanctuary is seen in the Old Testament,
and also existed in the worlds of Greece and Rome. The Catholic
Church continued the practice of extending sanctuary as early as 313
A.D. 2 Traditionally, a fugitive who reached a place of worship, such as
an altar or temple, was granted sanctuary and protection from any pur-
suers; after this temporary grant of asylum, the fugitive's choices were
exile from, or surrender to, the country in pursuit. 13 Already widespread
in the churches of medieval Europe, by the fifteenth century, sanctuary
was even offered by whole towns that declared themselves places of ref-
uge.1 4 In the sixteenth century, King Henry VIII curtailed this expan-
sion of sanctuary because many fugitives had thereby escaped
prosecution.
15
C. The Modern Sanctuary Movement in the United States
The sanctuary movement in the United States began in 1981 with a
chance meeting between a Salvadoran hitchhiker and a Quaker rancher
in Arizona and spread quickly among religious communities to become a
grassroots phenomenon. 6 Presently, a diverse mix of over 300 religious
communities have publicly declared themselves sanctuaries for Central
American refugees, as have a number of cities." Such declarations are in
direct response to the federal government's application and enforcement
of the 1980 Refugee Act.'8 Sanctuary workers claim that the govern-
ment applies the Act in violation of congressional intent, and in a manner
10. S. STUMPF, PHILOSOPHY HISTORY AND PROBLEMS 173 (1983).
11. L. WEINREB, supra note 7, at 2-3.
12. Note, The Sanctuary Movement: An Analysis of the Legal and Moral Questions In-
volved, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1221, 1225 (1986).
13. Id. at 1224-25.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee Policy,
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 493, 501 (1986) [hereinafter Helton I].
17. Id. at 493.
18. "The current invocation of sanctuary by North American churches is a dramatic re-
sponse to the refusal of the United States government to grant legal sanctuary, or asylum,
1026 [Vol. 23:1023
April 1990] THE NATURAL-LAW CLAIM TO SANCTUARY 1027
that discriminates against and-effectively excludes-Central Ameri-
cans, especially Guatemalans and Salvadorans. 9 Viewing the refugees as
fellow humans in need of divine protection, sanctuary workers feel mor-
ally and religiously obligated to obey a higher law than those passed and
applied by government officials.20 Sanctuary workers thus engage in civil
disobedience by helping the refugees gain entry to the United States, and
by offering them shelter, protection, and sometimes employment.2 1
D. The Tragic Situation Faced By Modern Refugees
An analysis of the situation of modern refugees is crucial to under-
stand the sanctuary movement, and necessary to fully grasp the applica-
bility of the natural-law claim to sanctuary for these refugees. The many
wars of the twentieth century have greatly exacerbated the refugee prob-
lem.22 By their nature, wars cause violence and unrest that dislocate peo-
ple. The creation of new countries that resulted from decolonization
after the two World Wars also played a significant role in the creation of
refugees.23 In a world system which resembles an anarchy of sovereign-
ties, huge numbers of individuals seeking haven from persecution have
emerged. 4 The causes of the Central American refugee problem stem
from the historic economic struggle over scarce resources and the tradi-
tion of non-democratic military government.2 5 Moreover, a long tradi-
tion of United States involvement in the region clearly impacts the
refugee flow from the area, through the United States' support of anti-
communist groups or governments.2 6 An analysis and understanding of
the impact of these factors on the indigenous populations in the re-
gion makes a compelling argument for the right to sanctuary for those
refugees.
Politics in Central America have been characterized by the "domi-
nance of a wealthy landed elite governing, occasionally with democratic
facades and almost always with the active collaboration of the mili-
under United States immigration laws, to refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala." I. BAU,
supra note 6, at 38.
19. Note, The Sanctuary Movement, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 598 (1986).
20. Note, supra note 12, at 1225.
21. Helton I, supra note 16, at 493.
22. E. FERRIS, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES 3 (1987).
23. G. FOURLANOS, supra note 3, at 119.
24. Id. Sovereignty is a complex term with many possible meanings, but most scholars
agree that the "term... indicates supremacy and superiority" in the country's legal capacity
to act. Id. at 40. Sovereignty is not absolute, but rather is the principle that expresses the
country's need for a "legal capacity in order to be able to perform its functions." Id. at 43.
25. E. FERRIS, supra note 22, at 14.
26. Id.
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tary. ' 21 Not surprisingly, the present crises in El Salvador and Guate-
mala, which have fueled the flow of refugees, share similar roots:
accumulations of wealth and land in the hands of a tiny percentage of the
population, growing masses of landless peasants, "historic pattern[s] of
dominance by a landed elite and by close ties with the United States.
' 2
During the 1970s, changes occurred which resulted in bloody political
turbulence in the region: Central America became more receptive to rev-
olutionary movements with the "radicalization ... of the clergy," the
formation of mass popular organizations, and the "growing disillusion-
ment with the [government's] rhetoric of reform."
29
These factors combined in the 1980s to transform the nature of
political violence in El Salvador and Guatemala. The successful 1979
Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua taught neighboring governments and
revolutionary movements that support by and control of the population
in the "countryside is the key to the revolution."30 Since then, the gov-
ernments of Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as the guerrilla forces in
each nation, have focused on the peasantry.3 1 Civilians can no longer
remain free from political struggles, as guerrilla attacks and harsh
counterinsurgency tactics are now aimed at the civilian population.32
Neutrality is no longer an option, as both sides perceive indifference as
support for their opponents. 33 "[G]overnmental definitions of the enemy
have broadened; the enemy is presently considered to be those individu-
als who are not actively supporting the government."34 This violence
and civil war drove approximately 1 to 1.5 million Central Americans
from their homes between 1980 and 1983. 35
Even more significant, the governments of El Salvador and Guate-
mala quickly learned that the key to United States aid and support was
staunch anti-communism. 36 In fact, the United States has provided
27. Id.
28. Id. at 25.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 14-15.
32. Id.
33. For example, the refugee in Diaz-Escobar v. Immigration and Naturalization Sery.
feared persecution by Guatemalan guerrillas because he chose to remain neutral in the conflict
between the government and the guerrillas. 782 F.2d 1488, 1490 (9th Cir. 1986). In contrast,
another refugee refused to join the Salvadoran army because he wanted to remain neutral in El
Salvador's civil war. Aviles-Torres v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 790 F.2d 1433,
1435 (9th Cir. 1986). As a result of his refusal, the Salvadoran government harassed him. Id.
34. E. FERRIS, supra note 22, at 15.
35. A. CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW
IN COLLISION xvi (1988).
36. Journalist Robert Tomsho notes that:
1028 [Vol. 23:1023
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military and economic support to these governments in their campaigns
against revolutionary movements.3 7 Sanctuary workers argue that
United States military aid has thereby contributed to the persecution of
civilians who are not active supporters of their government. 38 According
to sanctuary workers, this support of governments that persecute or that
tolerate persecution imposes a moral duty on Americans to help the vic-
tims of that persecution.3 9
Examination of the political situation and the political violence in El
Salvador and Guatemala, reveals the tragic persecution of the civilian
population. The United States' involvement through military aid to
these governments provides compelling support to the arguments for a
right to sanctuary for victims fleeing this persecution because this aid
amounts to United States governmental support of foreign governments
with records of human-rights abuses.
II. RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS FOR THE RIGHT TO SANCTUARY
Sanctuary workers argue that both the ancient tradition of asylum
and the precepts of the Bible support their efforts to help Central Ameri-
can refugees.' Thus, tradition and the Bible are interwoven strands sup-
porting the right to sanctuary.*"
the military governments of [El Salvador and Guatemala] ... were pictured as the
beleaguered torchbearers of democracy. The Reagan administration argued that,
although the anti-Communist leaders in Central America might not rate among the
world's humanitarians, failure to support them would pave the way for a string of
Soviet puppets that stretched from Panama to the Rio Grande.
R. ToMSHo, THE AMERICAN SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 96 (1987).
37. E. FERRIS, supra note 22, at 18. United States military/economic aid (in millions of
dollars per fiscal year) has been:
To Guatemala: To El Salvador:
1981-0.0/19.0 1981-35.5/114.0
1982-0.0/15.5 1982-82.0/182.2
1983-0.0/29.6 1983-81.3/245.6
1984-50.4/26.6 1984-331.5/75.4
1986-10/77 (proposed) 1986-351/133(proposed)
Id.
38. Id. at 22.
39. A. CRITTENDEN, supra note 35, at 65, 210.
40. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 124.
41. Sanctuary has a rich tradition. "By examining the historical tradition of sanctuary it
becomes evident that the contemporary invocation of sanctuary is not simply a legal or a
political phenomenon but rather the revival and continuation of an ancient [religious and his-
torical] tradition." Id.
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A. The Tradition of Asylum
While the tradition of sanctuary exists in the Old Testament, Greece
and Rome also recognized the right of asylum. Humanitarian concerns
fueled the grant of asylum in ancient Greece. 2 Originally, the Greek
concept of sanctuary aimed at providing shelter, from revenge-seeking
relatives, to those who had committed involuntary homicide.4 3 How-
ever, the grant of asylum quickly extended to provide shelter to common
criminals, and eventually replaced legal punishment with banishment or
imprisonment in the actual sanctuary.' 4 The temple of Diana at Ephesus
was the most famous Greek place of asylum,4" and the practice of grant-
ing sanctuary is well documented in the literature of that day." The
Romans continued the tradition of asylum, as they recognized certain
places as sacred, including the altars of their temples and the statues of
their emperors.47
The early Catholic Church continued the Greco-Roman tradition of
granting sanctuary. In 303 A.D., Constantine's Edict of Toleration rec-
ognized the practice of granting sanctuary within church grounds to
fugitives and criminals in physical danger.48 In an effort to regulate and
codify what was already an established privilege, the Theodosian Code of
392 A.D. enacted laws regarding the Church's grant of sanctuary.4 9
Originally, only the altar was a sacred place of refuge; however, around
450 A.D. Theodosius the Younger extended the place of refuge to within
the walls of the churchyard. 0 The early Church continued the tradition
of sanctuary mainly because it opposed violence. 1 The Church acted as
an intermediary between fugitives in physical danger and their pursuers
42. In Greece, "the original purpose of sanctuary ... [was to] shelter. . . those who
committed involuntary crimes." Id. at 130.
43. J. Cox, THE SANCTUARIES AND SANCTUARY SEEKERS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 2
(1911).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. For example in Aeschylus' Eumenides, Orestes successfully sought refuge at the tem-
ple of Athena from the Furies. GREEK DRAMA 55-79 (M. Hadas ed. 1982).
47. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 2. "Although abused in practice, the Roman Empire gener-
ally sought to limit the protection of the sanctuary privilege for the unfortunate and needy who
would be unable to endure the often harsh and merciless application of the criminal law." I.
BAU, supra note 6, at 130.
48. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 2.
49. Id. at 3. Under the Code, "public debtors . . . Jews, heretics, and apostates were
excluded from the sanctuaries. Thus, according to the earliest sanctuary legislation in the
Christian era, eligibility for asylum depended on both the nature of the crime and the character
of the accused." I. BAU, supra note 6, at 131.
50. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 3.
51. Id.
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in an effort not only to temper the "administration of public and private
law," but also to "increase the reverence for human life in the popular
mind" and to associate mercy and sanctity with Christianity.52
Finally, the early Church established few rules governing sanctuary
procedure. Under Gratian's Canon Law, fugitives seeking sanctuary
were not to be surrendered, or if they were denied sanctuary, they could
only be surrendered if the pursuers took an oath promising not to kill or
maim the fugitive. 3 Also, the fugitive could not enter church grounds
carrying weapons. 4
The tradition of granting sanctuary continued under Anglo-Saxon
law. In 597 A.D., Ethelbert, King of Kent, enacted one of the earliest
Anglo-Saxon codes of law.55 The code strongly recognized and enforced
the sanctity of churches.56 During this same period, a special kind of
sanctuary, "chartered sanctuary," arose.57  Chartered sanctuary ex-
tended and elaborated sanctuary beyond the ordinary sanctity of every
church. 8 Towns established themselves as chartered sanctuaries, and the
sanctuaries of Beverley and Durham exemplified this elaboration on
common sanctuary. 9
In 680 A.D., Ine, King of Wessex, expressly provided for sanctuary
in his code of laws as follows:
if any one be guilty of death, and he flee to a church, let him
have his life, and make "bot" [satisfaction or fine] as the law
may direct him. If any one put his hide in peril [by committing
a crime punishable by the lash] and flee to a church, be the
scourging forgiven him.6
52. Id. at 3-4. Fugitive slaves were the primary sanctuary seekers in the early Christian
churches. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 133. The bishops acted as the fugitive slaves' protectors and
advocates. Id.
[T]he Council of Orange allowed bishops to intervene between the fugitive slave and
the master. If the slave's complaint was valid then the master was forced to sell the
slave to the church or to another owner. The early church paid much money to
redeem slaves in this way. If the slave was returned to the master, the master first
had to take an oath that the pardon [for running away] would be given.
Id. at 132.
53. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 4-5.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Earlier that year, Augustine, after landing at Kent with forty monks, had converted
and baptized Ethelbert. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 134.
56. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7 (English translation). The privilege of sanctuary existed as part of a general
system of avenging wrongs. As Bau explains:
Under the ancient Saxon law of bloodfeud, any offender was subject to the revenge of
031
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Two centuries later, in 887 A.D., Alfred the Great codified sanctu-
ary laws even further.61 Under Alfred, the privilege of sanctuary nor-
mally extended seven days, but up to thirty days in some cases; more-
over, if a pursuer harmed a person in refuge during the privileged time,
the pursuer had to pay a fine.62 Finally, Alfred extended the sanctity of
the church and church grounds to include the priest's or bishop's
house.63
Near the end of the Anglo-Saxon period in 1014 A.D., King Ethel-
red declared that a fugitive who had committed a capital offense and
sought sanctuary either had to pay restitution to the victim's family or
otherwise be imprisoned for life." Ethelred also established a schedule
of penalties for those who violated sanctuary in pursuit of a fugitive.6"
The Normans, after defeating the Saxons in 1066, continued the An-
glo-Saxon tradition of granting sanctuary. Twelfth-century Norman law
recognized the "peace and immunity" of the church, and established
fines to punish those who violated the church's sanctity by pursuing fugi-
tives onto church grounds.66 Norman law also provided that only a
priest or clergy member could remove a person from sanctuary. 67 Fi-
nally, Norman law declared that a fugitive could not bring stolen prop-
erty into a sanctuary, and that the stolen property had to be returned to
the group or individual injured. Such a broad bloodfeud law can be contrasted with
the more limited rights of the Hebrew avenger of blood. Under the ancient Teutonic
tribal laws, most offenses involved a breach of the general peace, thereby making the
offender an outlaw, at feud with the entire community. That peace could only be
restored by coming to terms with the injured party. However, the victim had certain
rights of vengeance. The system of bot, or amends, provided a limit to this law of
feud and vengeance by fixing the amount of compensation required from the
offender.
I. BAU, supra note 6, at 135. Ine's 680 code restricted and regulated this bloodfeud. Id.
61. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 7.
62. Id. at 7. Under Alfred's law, a major purpose of the express statutory grant of asylum
was to "facilitate composition settlements between feuding parties." I. BAU, supra note 6, at
137. Under the law, the church had the privilege of sanctuary and church officials had to
provide lodging, but could not provide food to the fugitive. Id. at 138. Thus, the fugitive was
physically protected (even though surrounded by the pursuers) yet hungry. Id. This system
cooled the emotions of the pursuers by forcing them to maintain a vigil, while hunger en-
couraged the fugitive to reach rational settlement. Id.
63. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 7.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. The 1014 decree established fines for violation of church sanctuary according to
the status of the church. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 141. For example, the fine for violating the
sanctity of a principal church was more than the fine for violating the protection of a chapel.
Id.
66. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 9.
67. Id. at 10. After the Norman conquest, William failed to "specifically codify" the privi-
lege of sanctuary, yet in "general practice" he confirmed and preserved the extant Anglo-
Saxon law. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 142.
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its rightful owner.68
During the Plantagenet period, the privilege of sanctuary was highly
developed and widespread.69 A 1315 session of the Statutes of the Realm
permitted church officials to feed the fugitives, in addition to merely shel-
tering them.7° Also, by the fourteenth century, the sanctuary privilege
was closely tied with the "practice of abjuration of the realm .... [A
practice which was] tantamount to permanent exile for the sanctuary
seeker."71
In the sixteenth century the English monarchy broke with the Cath-
olic Church, and thus the period marks a decline in the previously gener-
ous grant of sanctuary. During the sixteenth century, the tradition of
sanctuary virtually disappeared as the English monarchs showed little
respect for church immunity,72 especially when political enemies sought
sanctuary in the churches.73 Henry VII obtained papal bulls74 from In-
nocent VIII in 1482, Alexander VI in 1493, and Julius in 1503 that se-
verely crippled the grant of sanctuary; the bulls increased the number of
offenses that were exempt from the privilege of sanctuary, including high
treason and suspicion of treason.
7-
Henry VIII continued his father's tradition. For example, a 1529
statute mandated that felons and murderers be branded or lose the privi-
lege of sanctuary, and exempted traitors from the right to asylum.76 A
1540 act further limited sanctuary by exempting those who committed
"murder, rape, burglary, robbery, arson, sacrilege and their accessories"
68. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 10.
69. 1. BAU, supra note 6, at 143.
70. Id. at 144.
71. Id. Under the practice of abjuration of the realm,
[t]he sanctuary seeker would be protected in the sanctuary for a limited time and
then would be required to leave England permanently. Rather than being forced to
pay compensation to satisfy the Anglo-Saxon law of bloodfeud, the sanctuary seeker
now had to submit to the operation of the criminal law.
Id. Through abjuration of the realm, the primary purpose of sanctuary was no longer to limit
private revenge and facilitate settlements. Id. "Instead, sanctuaries had become part of the
criminal law, facilitating the imposition of the sentence of banishment without trial. Sanctuary
seekers who abjured the realm chose this punishment instead of punishment after trial." Id.
72. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 319.
73. Id. The abuse of the privilege by debtors fleeing their creditors also led to the demise
of sanctuary in England's increasingly commercial society. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 150.
74. A bull is a document issued by the Pope. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (1st ed.
1969).
75. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 319-20.
76. Id. at 321. Under the statute, the abjurer was to be branded on the thumb just before
their oath of abjuration and exile. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 153. Since the abjurer was about to
go into exile, the purpose of the statute was mainly punitive, but it also discouraged fugitives
from seeking abjuration. Id. at 153-54. "A sanctuary seeker would be subject not only to exile
but a painful, permanent maiming." Id. at 154.
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from the privilege of sanctuary, and by abolishing chartered sanctuary. 7
The Act replaced chartered sanctuary by establishing limited sanctuary
in eight towns, with the rule that each town could have no more than
twenty persons in sanctuary at any one time.78
Edward VI, Henry's successor, restored the privilege for felons who
had committed crimes other than "treason, willful murder or aggravated
theft."' 79  Mary, who. was a devout Catholic, partially re-established
chartered sanctuary, but her Protestant successor Elizabeth, repealed the
re-establishment.8 0 The death knell for sanctuary came under James,
who first terminated the eight towns as sanctuaries, and at the end of his
reign, abolished sanctuary in the church or on church grounds."1
Up to the sixteenth century, a strong tradition of sanctuary existed'
in both the practice of the Catholic Church and in English law.8 2 In fact,
scholars have estimated that for many centuries in England as many as
1,000 people were in sanctuary in any given year. 3 Modem sanctuary
workers regard this tradition as a justification for the contemporary
movement.84 There are obvious differences between the historic and
modem movements. For example, the modem movement extends shel-
ter beyond a limited time duration, and past the confines of church
grounds, with some workers even helping refugees cross the United
States' border.8 5 Also, while the early recipients of sanctuary were often
criminals who violated laws of the realm, the current sanctuary seekers
are refugees who violated only immigration laws by entering the country
77. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 326. Prior to the 1540 Act, in 1536, the King had established
strict regulations on the fugitive while in the church sanctuary. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 154.
For example the sanctuary seekers had to wear badges or else lose the protection of sanctuary.
Id.
78. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 326.
79. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 156.
80. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 328.
81. Id. at 329. In the 1603-1604 session, Parliament abolished sanctuary by statute as
follows:
That so much of all Statutes as concerneth abjured Persons and Sanctuaries, or or-
dering or governing of Persons abjured or in sanctuaries, made before the five and
thirtieth yeere of the late Queene Elizabeth's Reigne, shall also stand repealed and be
voide.
I. BAU, supra note 6, at 156.
82. Id. at 148-50.
83. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 33.
84. See A. CRITrENDEN, supra note 35, at 93-94. In fact, Reverend Lundy, a Presbyterian
minister, told his congregation that John Calvin, a major figure in the Reformation, sought
and received sanctuary in Geneva. Id. at 94.
85. Crittenden documents numerous border crossings. See, e.g., id. at 66, 76.
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illegally. 86
However, there are striking similarities as well. Just as medieval
sanctuary was a response to barbaric law enforcement, 87 so the modem
movement is a response to the persecution suffered by these refugees, the
callous treatment of them by the United States government, and the un-
just enforcement of United States immigration laws.88
Drawing on these similarities, the modem sanctuary movement
views itself as keeper of a tradition of mercy and sanctity established
through the ages.8 9 Historically, the church served as an asylum, and the
sanctuary movement carries on this legacy.
B. Biblical Support for the Right to Sanctuary
Necessarily interwoven with this tradition of granting sanctuary is
the Biblical support for the grant of asylum. The Biblical roots of sanc-
tuary stem from the Old Testament. 0 In an effort to prevent relatives of
victims from avenging homicides, the "Mosaic Code" established the
"six Levitical cities of refuge, appointed for the refuge of involuntary
homicide until released from banishment by the death of the high
priest."91
86. This however works in favor of the Central Americans, because if criminals tradition-
ally received sanctuary, surely innocent refugees should be granted sanctuary.
87. See J. Cox, supra note 43, at 2.
88. Crittenden illustrates this callous treatment by contrasting the Central American im-
migrants with the Asian immigrants. She writes:
The Southeast Asians came in legally, with the blessing of the American government
as well as its people, while the Central Americans had to enter illegally and remain
by stealth. They were officially labeled "economic migrants," although their stories,
their scars, and common sense said otherwise. They were greeted as if they were
criminals, arrested and thrown into detention camps when they showed up at the
border, and offered the choice of returning, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the mael-
strom of the death squads, the guerrillas, and the military sweeps. The welcome they
received was not that of a good neighbor.
A. CRITrENDEN, supra note 35, at xvi-xvii. The callous treatment is also shown by the so-
called voluntary departure statements forced upon many immigrants by INS agents in deten-
tion centers. The immigrants in detention often
had no access to lawyers and were being told to sign papers, printed in English,
stating that they agreed to return voluntarily to El Salvador. If they balked at sign-
ing, they were reminded that they faced months in detention and would probably be
deported back to El Salvador in the end anyway.
Id. at 43.
89. Id. at 94, 185.
90. I. BAU, supra note 6, at 124.
91. J. Cox, supra note 43, at 1. See also Numbers 35:6-34. Moses was commanded to
create six cities of refuge for those who committed involuntary manslaughter, a "manslayer."
I. BAU, supra note 6, at 125. The manslayer could either be "one of the Israelites or a stranger
or sojourner among the people of Israel. The avenger of blood, who was the next of kin of the
person slain, was allowed to kill the accused 'manslayer' only if the accused was caught before
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Regarding the treatment of strangers, Leviticus commands: "if a
stranger lives with you in your land, do not molest him. You must count
him as one of your own countrymen and love him as yourself-for you
were once strangers yourselves in Egypt."'9 2 In essence, this command is
the "golden rule" of the Old Testament, and supports the grant of sanc-
tuary to the persecuted who are fleeing Central America. Thus, the Old
Testament stresses the positive duty to welcome and shelter the perse-
cuted and the ill-treated.
The mandate of a positive duty continues in the New Testament.
Sanctuary workers offer sanctuary "as an expression of the hospitality
which is asked of us by the Gospel."93 Sanctuary worker Phil Conger
remarked that Christianity demands that one make the world a better
place, and "[t]hat means working against institutions or people or tradi-
tions that tend to devalue human life or human dignity."94 In addition to
the Old Testament sources discussed above, this mandate also has roots
in the New Testament and the teachings of Jesus.
In Hebrews, the Bible says "remember always to welcome strangers,
for by doing this, some people have entertained angels without knowing
it. Keep in mind... those who are being badly treated, since you too are
in the one body." 95
Many theologians have described Jesus' commands to "love one an-
other as I have loved you," 96 and to "love your neighbor as yourself," 97
as the "centerpiece of [Jesus'] moral teaching."9 As such, these com-
mands carry a positive duty such as Conger describes, and such as the
sanctuary movement strives to fulfill.
Jesus' association with the outcasts of society expands on this
"golden rule."
For I was hungry and you never gave me food; I was thirsty
and you never gave me anything to drink; I was a stranger and
reaching a city of refuge." Id. When the fugitive reached the city of refuge, the elders of the
city held a trial to determine if the killing was accidental, and if so, the fugitive was protected
from the blood avenger within the city or its suburbs. Id. "[T]his protection was tantamount
to the commutation of capital punishment to life imprisonment." Id. Finally, if the high
priest of the city died, the fugitive could return home, and the avenger lost the right to avenge
the killing. Id.
92. Leviticus 19:33-34.
93. A. CRITTENDEN, supra note 35, at 94.
94. R. ToMsHo, supra note 36, at 154 (citing Tomsho's interview with Conger).
95. Hebrews 13:1-2.
96. John 15:12.
97. Matthew 22:39-40.
98. D. LOWERY, FOLLOWING CHRIST: A HANDBOOK OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING
19 (1982).
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you never made me welcome, naked and you never clothed me,
sick and in prison and you never visited me .... I tell you
solemnly, in so far as you neglected to do this to one of the least
of these, you neglected to do it to me.99
The sanctuary movement argues that such passages command a positive
duty to aid and shelter victims of persecution, and therefore justifies, and
even demands, their civil disobedience. 00
Aside from these Biblical passages, many sanctuary workers express
a belief in a responsibility to follow a higher law that requires giving
sanctuary. One worker has said that, "as a Christian he believed he had
a higher responsibility: to see that his government followed the law.
And no worldly authority could take away" the right and duty to help
fellow humans.101 Further, a priest said that the United States' involve-
ment in Central America creates a moral duty to provide shelter. "[I]f a
country was financing the planes that were bombing Salvadoran children,
the citizens of that country had an absolute moral obligation to help the
victims escape .... It is necessary reparation." 102
The words of both the worker and priest demonstrate that the natu-
ral-law claim to the right of sanctuary encompasses many levels: moral,
philosophical, religious, and international. Individually, no single level
justifies the actions of the sanctuary workers. But taken together, they
create a strong justification for aiding the persecuted in their escape from
Central America. However, the sanctuary movement relies heavily on
the religious arguments to support its actions. This reliance is natural
considering that churches and church leaders are the major founders of
the sanctuary movement in the United States.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE RIGHT TO SANCTUARY
A. Hugo Grotius
Often considered the founder of international law,0 3 Grotius also
contributed much to natural-law theory. True to the naturalist tradi-
tion,"° he believed that natural law is discoverable and dictated by
human reason, and that natural law is the basis for national law. O Gro-
99. Matthew 25:42-46.
100. A. CRrTTENDEN, supra note 35, at 210.
101. Id. (referring to Crittenden's interview with attorney Bates Butler).
102. Id. at 65 (referring to Crittenden's interview with Father Ricardo).
103. G. FOURLANOS, supra note 3, at 17.
104. For a discussion of the naturalist tradition, see supra notes 7-11 and accompanying
text.
105. G. FOURLANOS, supra note 3, at 17.
1037
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tius argued that the right to self-preservation and the right to basic neces-
sities are components of natural law discoverable through reason.
10 6
Grotius also argued that the free movement of people is a part of the
natural law; he therefore concluded that countries should not deny per-
manent residence to aliens seeking refuge, as long as the refugees did not
disrupt the public order and promised to obey the law of the host coun-
try.10 7 Grotius' specific argument for the right to sanctuary is a signifi-
cant indication that the right to sanctuary is derived from natural law.
B. Henry Shue
In his 1980 work Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and United
States Foreign Policy,'°8 Henry Shue presents the concept of individual
duties. The theory that individuals have a positive duty to aid other
humans in need supports both the right to sanctuary and the actions of
the sanctuary workers. At first blush, the concepts of duty and right
might not seem connected. However, the duty to aid and the right to
receive aid are closely connected. They are reciprocal concepts, and the
full realization of human rights is dependent on the mutual existence and
exercise of both the duty to act and the right to receive aid. i0 9 For exam-
ple, the right to receive sanctuary is effectively meaningless unless there
is a duty to provide shelter. Once this connection between duty and right
is understood, the importance of Shue's theory of individual duties be-
comes clear." 0
Shue argues that individuals have a duty to protect and promote
three basic rights possessed by all humans of every nationality. I These
three basic rights are the right to security, the right to liberty, and the
right to subsistence. 1 2 Corresponding to these basic human rights are
three human duties. First, one has a duty to not deprive others of their
basic rights.' Second, one has the duty to protect the basic rights of
others." 4 Finally, one has a positive duty to aid those whose basic rights
106. G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
152 (1973).
107. G. FOURLANOS, supra note 3, at 17-18.
108. H. SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
(1980).
109. Id. at 160.
110. For an excellent discussion of Shue's theory, see Gibney, The Refugee Act of 1980: A
Humanitarian Standard, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 585, 592-93 (1985/86).
111. H. SHUE, supra note 108, at 18.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 60.
114. Id.
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are not being met. 1 5 Applying Shue's concept to sanctuary, when a ref-
ugee flees persecution by a government, the basic rights to life, liberty
and security are clearly not being met. Therefore, the refugee has a right
to sanctuary in order to meet these basic rights, and other humans have a
duty to provide sanctuary and enable enjoyment of the refugee's basic
rights.
C. John Finnis
Finnis is a contemporary natural-law philosopher also. In his 1980
work Natural Law and Natural Rights, I 6 Finnis 1resents a modern natu-
ral-law theory based on human reason, not on religious dictates. Finnis
bases his theory on the claims that law should conform to the existence
of objectively valid normative principles, and that these principles can be
discovered through human reason.' 17 Human reason, Finnis asserts, can
discover these normative principles through a thought process comprised
of three levels: (1) recognition of the "basic values," (2) realization of
these values through the requirements of practical reasonableness, and
(3) ultimate discovery of the morality to which law ought to conform."I
Each level must be analyzed to understand Finnis' theory, and the natu-
ral-law support it provides for the right to sanctuary.
1. Level one: the "basic values"
As a foundation to establishing the existence of basic human goods,
or values," 9 Finnis points to anthropological data that illustrate various
concerns are common to all human communities.1 20  For Finnis, the
115. Id.
116. J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
117. L. WEINREB, supra note 7, at 109.
118. J. FINNIS, supra note 116, at 23.
119. In connection with the discussion of Finnis, the words goods and values are used
interchangeably.
120. J. FINNIS, supra note 116, at 81. Finnis writes that the anthropological surveys
entitle us, indeed to make some rather confident assertions. All human societies
show a concern for the value of human life; in all, self-preservation is generally ac-
cepted as a proper motive for action, and in none is the killing of other human beings
permitted without some fairly definite justification. All human societies regard the
procreation of a new human life as in itself a good thing unless there are special
circumstances.... All human societies display a concern for truth, through educa-
tion of the young in matters not only practical ... but also speculative or theoreti-
cal.... and all societies display a favour for the values of co-operation, of common
over individual good, of obligation between individuals, and of justice within groups.
All know friendship. All have some conception of... title or property, and of reci-
procity. All value play .... All treat the bodies of dead members of the group in
some traditional and ritual fashion.... All display a concern for powers or principles
which are to be respected as suprahuman.
Id. at 83-84.
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existence of common concerns proves the existence of basic human
values. 121
To determine what these basic human goods are, Finnis says one has
only to ponder what the basic aspects of human well-being and flourish-
ing entail; he concludes that such reasoning reveals seven basic human
values. 1 22 Clearly, life is such a good; and it includes "every aspect of the
vitality (vitra, life) which puts a human being in good shape for self-
determination."' 123 Knowledge, pursued for its intrinsic worth, is also a
basic good.'2 g Another basic good is play, which Finnis defines as activi-
ties pursued solely for the purpose of intrinsic enjoyment.12 Appreciat-
ing beauty, or aesthetic experience is the fourth basic good. 126 The fifth
basic good, friendship or sociability, involves at a minimum the creation
of some degree of harmony among humans, and at a maximum an at-
tempt to act for the well-being of one's friend. 12 7 Finnis argues that reli-
gion is also a basic good, but he defines religion broadly, as a search for
harmony with "that transcendent other and its lasting order.' 28 How-
ever, Finnis says a search which concludes that no "transcendent other"
exists is nonetheless part of the good of religion. 129 Finally, the seventh
basic good is practical reasonableness.'3 0 This good involves the process
of freely making choices and decisions that impact one's lifestyle and
character.13
According to Finnis, this list of the basic goods is exclusive, and
comprises all the basic purposes for action; any other good that might be
presented is only a facet of one, or a combination of, the enumerated
121. Id. at 84-85.
122. Id. at 85.
123. Id. at 86. For Finnis, life includes mental and physical health and freedom from pain.
Id. It also includes activities such as "the teamwork of surgeons and the whole network of
supporting staff... ; road safety laws and programmes; famine relief expeditions; farming and
rearing and fishing; food marketing; the resuscitation of suicides. . ." Id.
124. Id. at 87. Finnis also argues in great detail that it is self-evident that knowledge is a
basic good or value. Id. at 60-75.
125. Id. at 87. Finnis writes that "each one of us can see the point of engaging in perform-
ances which have no point beyond the performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake." Id.
126. Id. at 87-88. "[O]ften enough the valued experience is found in the creation and/or
active appreciation of some work of significant and satisfying form." Id. at 88 (emphasis in
original).
127. Id. at 88. "[F]riendship involves acting for the sake of one's friend's purposes, one's
friend's well-being." Id.
128. Id. at 89-90.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 88.
131. Id. Practical reasonableness "is the basic good of being able to bring one's own intelli-
gence to bear effectively on the problems of choosing one's actions and lifestyle and shaping
one's own character." Id.
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seven. 132 Further, he argues, these values are equally self-evident prem-
ises that can only be the foundation of a theory or argument-never the
conclusion of a set of premises. 13 3 The validity of self-evident goods can
be seen only by virtue of human reason, and not by a formal proof.134 To
Finnis, just as each good is equally self-evident, each good is also equally
fundamental and therefore no objective hierarchy exists among them. 135
However, Finnis acknowledges that individuals can and do choose to
treat one good as the most important and thereby create a subjective
hierarchy. 136 For example, in fleeing persecution, the refugee is placing
life first among the basic values and thus creates a subjective hierarchy.
This choice is rational though, given the often life-threatening danger
faced by the refugee.
In order to effectuate human flourishing through these basic values,
Finnis posits that a method of decision making is necessary.
2. Level two: the requirements of practical reasonableness
Finnis writes that these requirements "express the 'naturalfist's]'
method of working out the (moral) 'natural law' from the first (pre-
moral) 'principles of natural law,'" which are the basic human goods. 137
Practical reasonableness is the decision-making process that molds a per-
son's participation in the other values by guiding the broad choice of
commitment, the narrower choices of particular tasks, and the method of
performing each task to ensure fulfillment of the chosen commitment. 138
The requirements of this decision-making process are intended to incor-
132. Id. at 92.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 93.
135. Id. at 92. Finnis writes that "[e]ach is fundamental. None is more fundamental than
any of the others, for each can reasonably be focused upon, and each when focused upon,
claims a priority of value. Hence there is no objective priority of value amongst them." Id. at
93.
136. Id. at 92-93. This is an important point, because in fleeing persecution, the refugee is
choosing to treat life as the most important value. This is a reasonable choice which represents
a "change in... [that person's] chosen life-plan; ... [t]he change is not in the relation between
the basic values as that relation might reasonably have seemed to [the person] before ...
choos[ing] ... [the] life-plan." Id. at 93.
137. Id. at 103.
138. Id. at 100. Finnis argues that:
To have this choice between commitment to concentration upon one value ... and
commitment to others, and between one intelligent and reasonable project ... and
other eligible projects for giving definite shape to one's participation in one's selected
value, and between one way of carrying out that project and other appropriate ways,
is the primary respect in which we can call ourselves both free and responsible.
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porate the basic human goods into the choices humans make. 139
Some of the requirements of practical reasonableness are critical to
providing a natural-law claim for sanctuary. For Finnis, practical rea-
sonableness requires that no arbitrary preferences among basic goods or
among humans be made."4 When participating in the basic goods, one's
treatment of other humans must be impartial, and one's choice among
goods must not be arbitrary.14 ' Essentially, this requirement is a secular-
ization of the religious golden rule, 42 and is a "requirement that one's
moral judgments and preferences be universalizable."' 43
The golden rule plays a major role in the religious support for sanc-
tuary.1" A secular golden rule is thus important to philosophical sup-
port since such a rule requires that our rules of behavior be all-
embracing. Hence, providing sanctuary to those fleeing persecution is a
product of a secular golden rule since it is a product of the "universal-
izing question"-how would I like to be treated if I was fleeing
persecution?
Also important to Finnis are the requirements to follow your con-
science and to respect every basic value in every act. 45 The latter re-
quirement forbids performance of an act that "of itself does nothing"
besides damaging or hindering the attainment of another basic value. 1
46
Significantly, the requirement of respect for every value in every act man-
dates the "strict inviolability of basic human rights." 47 Finnis thus con-
cludes there are absolute human rights corresponding to the basic human
goods.1 48 The existence of absolute human rights is a foundation of the
139. Id. at 100-01.
140. Id. at 105.
141. Id. at 106-07.
142. Id. at 107.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
145. J. FINNIS, supra note 116, at 118-19, 125.
146. Id. at 118 (emphasis omitted). See also id. at 119. Finnis writes that:
To choose an act which in itself simply (or primarily) damages a basic good is
thereby to engage oneself willy-nilly (but directly) in an act of opposition to an in-
commensurable value (an aspect of human personality) which one treats as if it were
an object of measurable worth that could be outweighed by commensurable objects
of greater ... worth .... [This] can never be justified in reason.
Id. at 120.
147. Id. at 121.
148. Id. at 225. The existence of absolute human rights stem from the requirement of prac-
tical reasonableness "that it is always unreasonable to choose directly against any basic value,
whether in oneself or in one's fellow human beings." Id. Finnis notes that:
[Tihe basic values are not mere abstractions; they are aspects of the real well-being of
flesh-and-blood individuals. Correlative to the exceptionless duties entailed by this
requirement are, therefore, exceptionless or absolute human claim-rights-most ob-
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right to sanctuary, since a basic human right is the right to life and free-
dom from persecution.'
49
Applying Finnis' belief in absolute human rights to the sanctuary
movement reveals support for the grant of sanctuary. The existence of
an absolute human right to be free from persecution suggests the right to
be granted sanctuary from such persecution, especially in light of Shue's
theory of duty.150
The requirements of practical reasonableness provide the method
for making choices according to the principles of natural law, and the
basic values.15 ' According to Finnis, morality is the product of these
methodological requirements, and "each of the requirements can be
thought of as a mode of moral obligation or responsibility."' 52
Thus, in fleeing persecution, refugees make moral choices to seek life
and human flourishing. Further, sanctuary workers, in choosing to help
those fleeing persecution, make moral choices to enable and nurture the
basic human value of life, and act according to the requirements of prac-
tical reasonableness.
3. Level three: laws ought to conform to the moral standard
For a law to be morally obligatory, it must conform to the moral
standard as established by the requirements of practical reasonable-
ness. 1 A law that violates practical reasonableness, then, is not morally
obligatory. Working from this moral standard, Finnis' theory provides
an additional natural-law claim to sanctuary. The federal government's
application of the 1980 Refugee Act violates two natural laws established
by Finnis: the requirement of no arbitrary preferences among either ba-
viously, the right not to have one's life taken directly as a means for any further end;
.. and the... right not to be condemned on knowingly false charges.
Id.
149. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of Shue's theory of
duty.
151. J. FINNIS, supra note 116, at 100.
152. Id. at 126.
153. Id. at 359-60. Finnis' concept of authority and obligation can be summarized as
follows:
[T]he ruler has, very strictly speaking, no right to be obeyed...; but.., has the
authority to give directions and make laws that are morally obligatory and that he
[or she] has the responsibility of enforcing. [The ruler] has this authority for the
sake of the common good .... Therefore, if he [or she] uses [this] authority to make
stipulations against the common good, or against any of the basic principles of practi-
cal reasonableness, those stipulations altogether lack the authority they would other-
wise have by virtue of being [the ruler's].
Id. (emphasis in original).
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sic values or among persons,1 -4 and the requirement of respect for every
basic value in every act, 15 -which mandates absolute human rights.
In passing the 1980 Refugee Act, Congress explicitly intended to
bring United States law within international refugee law.'5 6 For exam-
ple, the House Report stated that "the Committee intends to emphasize
that the plight of the refugees themselves, as opposed to national origins
or political considerations, should be paramount in determining which
refugees are to be admitted to the United States."15 7 However, foreign
policy plays the determinative role in considering asylum applications; as
one State Department official said in an interview with author Elizabeth
Ferris: "[O]f course refugee policy is political. We accept as refugees
those individuals coming from our 'enemy of the day.' Those coming
from friendly countries are simply not accepted as refugees."'
' 58
This discriminatory application of the Refugee Act violates the nat-
ural-law requirements in applying an arbitrary and biased standard that
violates the refugee's absolute human rights to life and the basic necessi-
ties. "' 9 In denying the grant of asylum, the major consideration is for-
eign policy, not the rights of the individual refugees, many of whom are
indeed victims of persecution and probably would meet the requirements
of the law if a politically neutral standard were applied. Finally, the
United States has a duty to grant sanctuary because it helped deprive the
refugees of their basic rights by supporting governments that tolerate or
engage in persecution." °
Under natural law, absolute human rights mandate the right to
sanctuary for those fleeing persecution. Thus, the consideration for
granting asylum should not be the United States' political alliances, but
rather whether the refugee is fleeing persecution. The basic human value
of life demands that the question of persecution be the determinative fac-
tor in granting asylum. To insure the basic human values and rights to
154. Id. at 105-06.
155. Id. at 118.
156. In Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court wrote
that:
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of... the entire 1980 Act, it is that
one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into con-
formance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
[citation omitted] to which the United States acceded in 1968. Indeed the definition
of "refugee" that Congress adopted, ... is virtually identical to the one prescribed by
Article 1(2) of the Convention.
480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
157. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1979).
158. E. FERRIS, supra note 22, at 7.
159. See supra notes 103-58 and accompanying text.
160. Church, No Place to Run, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990, at 42.
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life and freedom from persecution, sanctuary must be extended to refu-
gees in such danger. Thus, the existence of the basic values and rights
justifies the actions of the sanctuary movement.
IV. THE RIGHT TO SANCTUARY AS ESTABLISHED IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN-RIGHTS DOCUMENTS
Natural law is a foundation for the contemporary theories of human
rights that are expressed in international documents. 61 The issue ad-
dressed by international human-rights law, whether humans possess cer-
tain rights simply by virtue of being human, is also a theme of natural
law.162 The fact that international law has, through various documents,
recognized certain basic human rights 63 is significant to sanctuary work-
ers in their attempt to justify giving shelter to aliens. Sanctuary workers
argue that the right to asylum for those threatened with unjust imprison-
ment, physical harm, or death, is a human right recognized in "emerging
norms of customary international law, [and that giving sanctuary is]
within and even required by [international] law."'"
A. The Charter of the United Nations
The Charter of the United Nations'65 provides a foundation for the
twentieth-century developments in human-rights laws. Various articles
in the Charter deal with issues relevant to the right to sanctuary. Specifi-
cally, chapter IX 166 deals with international economic and social cooper-
ation and contains many of these relevant provisions. 67 The Charter
proclaims rights to personal security and sovereignty.' 68 Inherent in
these concepts are the rights to protection from crime, to freedom of
movement, and to privacy in terms of both physical privacy and mental
privacy of thought and religion.' 69 Finally, the Charter also proclaims
economic and social rights, the so-called welfare rights.' 70 Thus, the
sanctuary movement argues that the fundamental international docu-
161. G. FOURLANOS, supra note 3, at 63.
162. Id. at 63-64.
163. For example, international law has recognized such basic human rights as the rights to
life and to basic necessities. See, eg., U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. C; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948).
164. Helton I, supra note 16, at 493.
165. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. C (enforced in the United States on Oct. 24, 1945).
166. Id.
167. Id. art. 55, paras. A-C. See also id. art. 1, para. 3; id. art. 13, para. lB.
168. Id. art. 1, para. 2. See also id. art. 2, para. 1.
169. Id. art. 55, para. C.
170. Id. art. 55, para. A.
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ment, the United Nations Charter, recognizes and proclaims the basic
human rights that refugees are seeking, and that the movement is trying
to provide.
171
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 172 also proclaims
fundamental rights. The Universal Declaration proclaims the right to
personal freedom and security, the right to freedom from torture, and the
right to freedom of movement.' 7 3 Significantly, Article 14 states that
"everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution."' 74 However, while the Declaration asserts the refugees'
right to seek asylum, it fails to create a positive duty on any country to
grant asylum to any individual refugee. Despite this flaw, the Declara-
tion's recognition of at least the right to seek asylum is significant to the
sanctuary movement.
C. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 75 deals
specifically with the plight of refugees.' 76 Article 33 of the 1951 Conven-
171. Crittenden quotes from a letter sent by sanctuary-movement leader John Fife to Attor-
ney General William French Smith:
We are writing to inform you that Southside United Presbyterian Church will pub-
licly violate the Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 274 (A) ....
We take this action because we believe the current policy and practice of the
United States Government with regard to Central American refugees is illegal and
immoral. We believe our government is in violation of the 1980 Refugee Act and
international law by continuing to arrest, detain, and forcibly return refugees to the
terror, persecution, and murder in El Salvador and Guatemala.
A. CRrrIENDEN, supra note 35, at 73-74 (emphasis added).
172. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
173. Id. at art. 14.
174. Id.
175. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(signed at Geneva) [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. The United States was not a party to the
1951 Convention, but the United States in November 1968 became a party to the 1967 Proto-
col, which incorporated the provisions of the 1951 Convention. Protocol Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (in force for the United
States November 1, 1968).
176. Article 1 of the 1951 Convention provides the following definition of refugee:
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 'refugee' shall apply to
any person who:
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
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tion established the principle of non-refoulment.' 7 Under international
human-rights law, as embodied in Article 33 of the Convention, "a per-
son has the right to non-return based on an objective finding that the
country of origin, or the country of return... [has] a consistent pattern
of human-rights violations."17 Critical to the right to sanctuary, this
principle established the right under international law not to be sent back
to any country where the refugee faces persecution. Sanctuary workers
argue that the United States therefore violates international law when it
returns refugees to El Salvador and Guatemala;179 countries whose
human-rights violations have been clearly documented by groups such as
Amnesty International and by the scars borne by the refugees
themselves. 8°
D. The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
Finally, the 1967 Protocol.8 also dealt with the status of refugees.
The United States became a party to the 1967 Protocol in 1968, and is
thus bound by its provisions. Under the provisions of the Protocol, sig-
natories agree to abide by provisions 2 through 34 of the 1951 Conven-
tion. 82 The United States, then, is legally bound by the non-refoulment
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
1951 Convention, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.
177. Article 33 provides in relevant part:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a partic-
ularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Id. at 176.
178. Parker, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 7 WHMTTER L. REv. 675, 679 (1985).
179. See supra note 171.
180. Interviews with the refugees reveal stories of torture and persecution, stories that are
often evidenced by physical scars. For example, Robert Tomsho interviewed Juan, a medical
student who was arrested by the Salvadoran military for donating his medical services to the
refugees in camps in San Salvador. R. TOMSHO, supra note 36, at 2. Juan told of twenty-four
days of interrogation, which was punctuated by various forms of torture including electric-
shock torture. Id. at 3. Juan also showed the scars of his twenty-four day ordeal. Id. at I.
Such stories abound. See e.g., I. BAU, supra note 6, at 76-78; A. CRITrENDEN supra note 35,
at 64, 66, 170; R. ToMSHO, supra note 36, at 49-58, 59-78.
181. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 1, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (signed at New York, January 31, 1967) (in force for United
States November 1, 1968) [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
182. In relevant part, the Protocol provides:
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provision of the 1951 Convention discussed above. 18 3 Therefore, sanctu-
ary workers argue that the United States is violating international and
domestic law by returning Salvadorans and Guatemalans when those ref-
ugees face persecution and death in their home countries.1
8 4
Thus, the focus of natural law on rights possessed by virtue of being
human,"8 5 and its belief in a morally binding law that is discoverable by
reason,18 6 serve as foundations for the twentieth-century focus on inter-
national human-rights laws. As positive law, these conventions them-
selves are not natural law. However, as international law they reflect
universal human beliefs; as such, the Charter, the Declaration, the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol are evidence of natural-law tenets that
express basic human values. These international documents support a
right to sanctuary by proclaiming certain fundamental rights, and by ex-
emplifying a standard of human rights that governments and laws should
support and foster.
E. The Meaning of Persecution in International Law
International law is also significant to the sanctuary movement be-
cause it gives international legal meaning to the natural-law claim to be
free from persecution. 187 While the term persecution appears in numer-
ous international documents, none precisely define it.'8
Articles 31 and 33 of the 1951 Convention refer to those whose "life
or freedom may be threatened," but state nothing beyond this general
threat of bodily injury.' 89 Thus, the meaning of persecution must be ana-
lyzed within the broad context of human rights, beyond solely physical
threats, and balanced by issues of degree and proportion. The concept of
persecution is therefore open to a wide range of interpretations. 9
1. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclu-
sive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined.
2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, except as re-
gards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the defi-
nition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events occurring
before 1 January 1951 and . . ." and the words "... as a result of such events," in
article 1A(2) were omitted.
3. The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any
geographic limitation ....
Id. at 268, 270.
183. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
184. A. CRITTENDEN, supra note 35, at 74.
185. J. FINNIS, supra note 116, at 223-25.
186. G. FOURLANOS, supra note 3, at 17.
187. Id. See also supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
188. G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1983).
189. 1951 Convention, supra note 175, at 174, 176.
190. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 188, at 38. See also Helton, Persecution on Account of
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Clearly, physical torture qualifies as persecution. 191 However, ex-
treme economic inequity, deliberate denial of employment or education,
and other serious restrictions of human freedom can also constitute per-
secution. 192 To determine whether these restrictions constitute persecu-
tion requires a balancing of various factors including the "nature of the
freedom threatened, the nature of the restriction, and the likelihood of
the restriction [actually occurring] in the individual case."' 193 If a funda-
mental freedom is threatened with a high likelihood of severe restriction,
then the restriction probably constitutes persecution.
Persecution is also closely related to the concept of protection. A
country's lack of protection for its inhabitants can lead to a presumption
that any fear of persecution held by those residents is well-founded. 194
This presumption is based on the concept that nations have a duty to
protect their citizens, and the idea that such protection is a governmental
function.' 95 Further, in cases of persecution where the government can-
not be directly implicated, such as the violence resulting from death
squads in Central American countries, the lack of governmental protec-
tion can amount to persecution. When the government will not protect
its population against such violence, that violence can equal persecution
because of the government's tacit acceptance and approval of the vio-
lence. In this way, the definition of persecution is not limited to the ex-
plicit actions of the government or its agents.' 9
6
Therefore, the proper definition of persecution includes acts com-
mitted by the government, and behavior "tolerated by the government in
such a way as to leave the victim virtually unprotected by the agencies of
the state."
197
Membership in a Social Group As a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV.
39, 54-56 (1983) [hereinafter Helton II]. The Convention and Protocol themselves only list the
term persecution, and the five relevant grounds of persecution, and do not include any inter-
pretations or definitions. Thus, the interpretations and definitions used in this Comment be-
long to Arthur C. Helton, A. Grahl-Madsen, and G. Goodwin-Gill. All three are preeminent
in the area of international law and in the work of the United Nations. Further, since the 1980
Refugee Act was intended to bring United States law into conformity with the 1967 Protocol,
and lists the same five grounds of persecution as does the Protocol, this interpretation is appli-
cable when construing the 1980 Refugee Act. For a discussion of the Act and congressional
intent see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
191. Torture is defined as the "infliction of severe pain as a means of punishment or coer-
cion." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (Ist ed. 1969).
192. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 188, at 38-39.
193. Id. at 39.
194. Id. at 38.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 42.
197. 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 81, at
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1. The five relevant grounds of persecution
The 1951 Convention lists five relevant areas of persecution that en-
able the victim to claim refugee status: race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group, and political opinion. 198 Each factor
should be individually analyzed in order to grasp the meaning and pur-
pose of the Convention and subsequent Protocol.
The ground of persecution based on race rests on a broad definition
of race, and refers more to social prejudice than to scientific racial classi-
fications.' 99 Involving a social "more than an ethnographic concept," it
applies "whenever a person is persecuted because of... ethnic origin.
' '
1
2 °
In an effort to counter religious intolerance, the Convention also in-
cludes religious persecution. Religious persecution can result from a per-
son's membership in a religious organization and participation in public
worship, a person's personal and private worship, or an individual's "re-
ligiously motivated acts or omissions (e.g. refusal to [enlist in the
military])."
201
Persecution based on nationality could arise in many circumstances,
189 (1966). In addition, persecution can affect not only the individual targeted, but also the
individual's family. Thus, international law provides for reunion of the family of persecution
victims who have fled their country. Id. § 151, at 414.
Because of the importance of family unity, refugee status under the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol applies also to the victim's family. Id. § 151, at 413. If the victim-applicant has
been persecuted on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular
group, it is highly probable that all members of that family will be subject to persecution on
such grounds. Id. § 153, at 421-43. Further, since the term political opinion can be inter-
preted broadly, if one member of a family is persecuted because of a perceived political opin-
ion, all members of the family face a likelihood of persecution. Id. § 153, at 422. This is
especially true where the government is prone to take hostages in an effort to crush political
opposition. Id.
The discussion above presents examples of direct persecution, whether actual or potential.
Indirect persecution is also possible, thereby necessitating refugee status for the entire family.
For example, even if only the adult males of a particular social group are directly persecuted,
the families of those men will be indirectly persecuted as a result of the victim's suffering. Id.
§ 154, at 423. Thus, refugee status for the victim and the victim's family is necessary to insure
the natural right to be free from persecution
198. 1951 Convention, supra note 175. It is important to note that the 1980 Refugee Act
lists the same five grounds. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 1253(h) (1988).
199. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 188, at 27; A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 197, § 89,
at 218. An ethnic group is a "descent group, differentiated by language, culture, style, national
origin, kinship ties and religious belief." Helton II, supra note 190, at 43.
200. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 197, § 89, at 218. Persecution of indigenous popula-
tions in Central America exemplifies this category. As Central American governments "come
to realize that the primary loyalty of their indigenous populations is not to the institutions of
the state but to community institutions," these governments begin persecuting the indigenous
populations. E. FERRIS, supra note 22, at 140.
201. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 197, § 89, at 218.
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such as persecution because of ethnicity, religious membership and cul-
tural or linguistic associations.2"2 Further, the persecuted group does not
have to be a minority in the country to fall under this category.20 3
Like persecution based on nationality, persecution based on mem-
bership in a particular social group is a "catch-all" category, with a
meaning broader than all the combined definitions of race, religion, and
ethnic groups.2" With this ground, the Convention recognizes that gov-
ernments often make irrelevant distinctions on the basis of social groups,
that lead to arbitrary repression.205 A broad and open-ended category,
persecution on account of membership in a social group includes ele-
ments such as shared values, backgrounds, and interests.20 6 It covers
various "uniting factors" like culture, language, education, and personal
hopes.20 7 Specific examples of social groups include members of profes-
sions, members of the nobility or middle class, members of the business
community, and even members of clubs and associations.20 8
Finally, persecution because of political opinion is a significant fac-
tor in considering the persecution suffered by Central American refugees,
and that definition encompasses "any opinion on any matter in which the
machinery of state government and policy may be engaged. 1 °2 0 9 This cat-
egory includes both the individual persecuted because of connections
with a previous regime and those oppressed for refusing to join or coop-
erate with the current government.210 In addition to refusal to cooper-
ate, a privately expressed belief can also qualify as a political opinion. 11
Finally, journalistic activities also fall under the political opinion
spectrum.212
202. Id. § 89, at 219.
203. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 188, at 29.
204. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 197, § 89, at 219.
205. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 188, at 29-30. According to Arthur Helton, the" 'so-
cial group category' was meant to be a catch-all which could include all the bases for and types
of persecution which an imaginative despot might conjure up." Helton II, supra note 190, at
45.
206. Helton II, supra note 190, at 51.
207. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 188, at 30. As Helton notes, the United Nations
Handbook refers to social groups as "'persons of similar background, habits, or social status,'
and explicitly denies that even this amorphous description is exclusive." Helton II, supra note
190, at 47 (citing HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES at 19, para. 77 (UNHCE Geneva 1979)).
208. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 197, § 89, at 219. In general, social groups can be
classified as "statistical, societal, social or associational." Helton II, supra note 190, at 51.
209. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 188, at 31.
210. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 197, § 91, at 224.
211. Id. at 225.
212. Id. at 226.
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Thus, international law provides a broad interpretation of the five
grounds for persecution listed in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Pro-
tocol. This broad interpretation is important to the sanctuary movement
for two reasons. First, the Refugee Act of 1980 lists the same five areas
of persecution as grounds for receiving asylum or withholding of depor-
tation.21 3 Second, in creating the Act, Congress intended to bring United
States law into conformity with the 1967 Protocol.21 4 Given the similar-
ity of the relevant grounds and congressional intent, the interpretation of
the grounds under international law is relevant to the interpretation of
domestic law. Further, the broad interpretation of the grounds under
international law justifies the sanctuary movement's sheltering refugees
whose suffering amounts to persecution under international law.
The nature of political violence in Central America has transformed
neutrality into an excuse for persecution. As governments and guerrillas
move the warfare to the countryside and seek the support of the peasants,
the combatants perceive the peasants' neutrality or indifference as sup-
port for their opponents.2"' Essentially, the persecutor sees the typical
political refugee as a threat to the regime and its institutions because of
the victim's perceived political opinions.2" 6
In sum, it is the persecutor's belief that the refugee presents a threat
to its existence because of the victim's race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a group, or political opinion, which underlies the victim's
claim for refugee status and thereby necessitates the right to sanctuary.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the roots of the right to sanctuary run deep in human his-
tory. The tradition of granting asylum existed both in the Old Testa-
ment217 and in ancient Greece and Rome.21 8 The early Catholic Church
and medieval monarchs codified the grant of sanctuary, and the practice
flourished in Europe and England until the sixteenth century.21 9
Religious and philosophical support for the right also are deeply
rooted. The Old Testament and the New Testament both contain
precepts that mandate the right to sanctuary. 220 Furthermore, natural-
213. For a discussion of the 1980 Refugee Act, and its terms, see supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text.
214. For a discussion of congressional intent, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
215. E. FERRIS, supra note 22, at 14-15. See also supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
216. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 188, at 31.
217. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 48-89 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
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law tenets recognize the existence of basic human rights to life and free-
dom from persecution, as well as corresponding duties to ensure these
basic rights.221 Finally, international human-rights conventions that re-
flect universal human beliefs also support the existence of basic human
rights, especially the right of non-refoulment.222
Sanctuary workers argue that taken together-tradition, history,
religious precepts, philosophical tenets and human rights-all support
the right to sanctuary and the moral duty to provide such sanctuary.
Amy Eileen Hoyt*
221. See supra notes 103-60 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 161-212 and accompanying text.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Robert W. Benson for his insightful comments
and creative ideas.
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